World Peace Convention 2018, Keynote Address 1.
Incheon Harbor Park Hotel, Grand Ballroom(2F)
<Hubris, Hardship, Humility, and Hope – The urgency of a fundamental Paradigm Shift to achieve peace & reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula>
Prepared remarks by David H. Satterwhite, Ph.D.
for the 2018 World Peace Convention, Seoul/Incheon, Republic of Korea
1. [Speaker1] David Satterwhite.hwp
Appreciation
Ladies and Gentlemen, Honored Participants and Guests… Permit me to begin my remarks with an expression of heartfelt appreciation to the Members of the Organizing and Advisory Committees for your kind invitation for me to be with you today – I am honored and humbled to be amongst such notables, and I am very pleased to have this opportunity to share insights and dialogue, asking for your patience, your guidance, and a shared spirit of seeking, nurturing, and enabling peace in NE Asia, particularly on the Korean Peninsula.
The Scope & Thrust of my Remarks
You will see that I have entitled my remarks “Hubris, Hardship, Humility, & Hope”, and that I have issued a call for a fundamental Paradigm Shift in how major powers – principally including the United States – have perceived, analyzed, and actively involved themselves in determining the lives and fate of the Korean people.
As we are at a truly historic juncture between a war-torn past of hardships, on the one hand, and the opportunity to chart a future based on the Korean people’s hopes and aspirations for dialogue, reconciliation, and sustainable peace, we need to be crystal clear on how the existing paradigm came about and persists, as it can still thwart the emergence of a truly peaceful, reconciled Korean future.
An historic juncture requires that we understand history. The nature of paradigms requires that we understand how difficult a task it is to bring about a paradigm shift. The manner in which the Korean people have been denied a greater, subjective voice in determining their own fate and preferred directions, also requires that we “speak truth to power” (as we say in the Quaker faith).
While recognizing the roles of all stakeholders in this process, it is our responsibility to point out the depth of hubris that the United States and other powers continue to display. It is not appropriate that those powers claim – by their words and actions – greater influence and decision-rights for Korea’s future than they would give to the Korean people themselves.
If we have understood history and the pervasive paradigm still “in the driver’s seat” – a paradigm focused on strategic calculations, hostilities, and war-fighting capabilities – we can more effectively design the components of the paradigm to take its place.
We can conduct our own strategic planning and envision scenarios – not of “surgical strikes” or “collateral damage” – but strategic planning and scenarios to responsibly craft a structure that nurtures and maintains a durable peace.
Our vision of peace goes beyond a war-footing that mistakes “peace” for the “absence of hostilities”, a war-footing which by its very nature constantly teeters – “24/7” – on the brink of war. “Security” in the present paradigm has fostered a perverted insecurity;; military might – including nuclear weapons on both sides – has served as a substitute for statesmanlike diplomacy that would proactively reduce the need for those weapons.
After surveying the history and paradigm that has brought us to this juncture, then, I would ask that we focus on the components of an alternative paradigm. These include: Confidence-building measures, Multi-dimensional exchanges, Diplomatic relations, a negotiated Treaty that ends the Korean War, and Economic cooperation that incentivizes stability and guards against unilateral risk.
Our passion for peace can and must prevail, just as the Korean people persevered until they achieved their “Seoul Spring”, rejecting the authoritarian, military- dominated regimes of the past. Through great hardship and sacrifice, the Korean people – under leadership I was privileged to work with – brought about an inclusive, representative, democratic politics that upholds human rights and the rule of law in the Republic of Korea. We share their hopes and aspirations for the next achievement – for the Korean people themselves to determine the direction and pace of potential reunification of an arbitrarily divided Korean nation and peninsula.
“Clausewitz on his head” – Ending a history of great-power rivalry, interference, & war
Let me elaborate on the themes I have outlined thus far, beginning with some key historical points, as a backdrop to what I have termed “Hubris vs. Humility”.
It has been an important rallying cry in next-door China to reflect on their “Century of Humiliation” – bracketed by the Opium Wars in the 1840s to the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. China was, indeed, humiliated by Western colonial incursions, spheres of influence, and then by a vicious war perpetrated by Japan, before regaining its pride and rebuilding its strength. We hope that China’s reflection on history will restrain it from causing hardships or humiliation for its own people or others.
In Korea, we need to reflect carefully on a “Century of War” in and surrounding the Peninsula – a period of war longer than a century that persists to this day.
Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- 05 – both wars fought to establish big-power dominance over Korea – the Korean people suffered the humiliation of a cultural war at the hands of Japan’s colonial rule, from 1910 to Liberation in 1945. Many resisted and were brutally crushed in the non-violent March 1st nationwide uprising calling for self-determination and independence;; others went into the hills and fought a guerilla war. Korea then played a tragic role in Japan’s war of aggression in Asia.
“Liberation” from colonial hardship, however, came with what has been described as the first act of the Cold War in Asia – the division of the Korean Peninsula. The “temporary division” was suggested by the U.S. just days after Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the entry of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan, yet that “temporary” has now lasted 73 years. Internal warfare continued during the U.S. Military Government over southern Korea, 1945-48, and persisted until the outbreak of the Korean War itself in 1950 – the Cold War’s first “hot” war.
We are all aware that the Korean War – fought with enormous damage and suffering for three years – has not ended. The Armistice brought a ceasefire, but the 65 years since 1953 have seen constant hostilities, an expensive arms’-race, two states and their societies on a war-footing, debilitating distrust and reciprocal enemy-images, internal suppression justified by both states on the ongoing hostilities, and escalation that almost resulted in cataclysmic war, with potent examples in 1976, 1994, and – as we witnessed in 2017 – a ratchetting up of tensions and the real possibility of war.
In short, the Korean people and Peninsula have experienced some form of warfare for almost 125 years, and it is high time – long overdue – that genuine peace should end this tragic, ongoing period of war.
Students of history will likely have encountered the name Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general who 200 years ago wrote a widely read and influential work entitled On War. As I have encountered and analyzed Korea over the past 40+ years, I have frequently noted that the state of war on the Peninsula, and particularly as perceived and acted upon by U.S. security strategists and policy-makers, has “stood Clausewitz on his head”. Let me explain what I mean, and why I cite him today.
Clausewitz is best known for an often-quoted phrase, “War is but an extension of diplomacy by other means”, also quoted as “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means” (On War, Book 1, Chap. 1, 24, J.J. Graham 1873 translation). The focus I offer is on Clausewitz’ phrase “extension of diplomacy by other means.”
What we have witnessed since the Armistice was signed in 1953 is perpetual war – a readiness and calculated capability to engage in active hostilities at any moment, with virtually any means at the security forces’ disposal, including nuclear weapons. “Extension of diplomacy by other means” has been a continuous war, in the almost total absence of diplomacy. In other words, when diplomacy has been attempted, it has been the opposite of what Clausewitz articulated – it has been an “extension of war” rather than “war as the extension of diplomacy...” War has been “in the driver’s seat”;; war has been the dominant paradigm;; diplomacy has been an afterthought as a part-time endeavor merely as an extension of war by other means.
I’d like to come back to this paradox in a few minutes, as it ties in to my remarks on Hubris & Humility, as well as to my insistence on the need for a Paradigm Shift in strategic and policy-making considerations of the ongoing Korean War, and to our search for a genuinely peaceful future – ending the War and building a Paradigm of Peace.
Hubris vs. Humility – Overcoming the arrogance of hegemonic decision-making
In sharp contrast to the belligerent rhetoric that signaled how close the U.S. had come to a preemptive use of force against the DPRK throughout 2017, we have been witness to a dramatic shift in tone since January of this year. From war- mongering, to a series of summits involving the two Korean states, the PRC, and the U.S., the world and we sighed with relief, hopeful that more reasonable approaches might, through dialogue, move the Peninsula from a war-footing to a more stable place. I share in the guarded spirit of optimism that has replaced the concerns we all had a year ago – a hope that we may, indeed, be moving in the direction of peace.
As we celebrate a year – thus far – of hopeful dialogue, however, I want us to be mindful of the paradigm still very much in place, and the dangers of resistance and back-sliding we still face in relations surrounding the Peninsula.
A few moments ago I reminded us of the warfare that has framed the last 125 years of Korean history. Let me provide another dimension to that history, with a focus on major-power attitudes toward their “ownership” and “decision-rights” pertaining to Korea, in a spirit of “speaking truth to power” I also referenced earlier today. This is less an attempt to “blame”, and more an effort to caution against the arrogance of hegemonic decision-making that has characterized U.S., Japanese, and other powers’ attitudes towards Korea – past, present, and the future.
We know that Czarist Russia and the Qing Dynasty in China, just years before each came to an end, fought wars with Japan over dominance of Korea, and we know the outcome in favor of Japan, leading to the establishment in 1905 of a Protectorate over Korea following the Treaty of Portsmouth that the U.S. helped broker with Russia. 1905 also marks a checkered history of U.S. involvement in Korea’s destiny that remains fresh in many minds, despite the passage of over 100 years. A brief list may suffice, as we are more concerned with the future than with rehashing the past.
• The Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905 – a memorandum in which the U.S., in return for assurances that Japan would not take aggressive steps against the Philippines (a U.S. colony since 1898), recognized Japan’s interests in establishing a Protectorate, with intentions to eventually colonize Korea.
• The U.S. complicity in refusing a delegation of Korean nationalists to represent Korea’s interests in the 1907 Hague Convention, arguing that the Protectorate of 1905 gave Japan rights over Korea’s foreign relations.
• The U.S. proposal to Stalin for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to “accept the surrender of Japan” south and north of the 38th Parallel, respectively – in a “temporary division” of the Peninsula – as the U.S. recognized that the Soviet Union, newly at war with Japan from Aug 8, would likely control all of Korea. [Colonels Dean Rusk & Charles Bonesteel proposed the 38th Parallel on Aug 10-11 in Washington, D.C., when ordered to select a suitable line in Korea]
• The establishment of a U.S. Military Government in Korea (1945-48), installa- tion of ultra-conservative Syngman Rhee, active suppression of the liberal/left of the political spectrum, and refusal to accept initial calls for self-government.
• Tacit acceptance of the 1961 coup d’etat carried out by Gen. Park Chung-Hee (PCH), followed by U.S. support for the PCH regime even during the years of increasingly authoritarian rule under the Yushin Constitution (1972-79).
• U.S. refusal to intervene when the Chun Doo-Hwan/Roh Tae-Woo military regime planned to militarily retake Kwangju in May, 1980, despite requests by the Kwangju Citizens’ Committee that the U.S. assist in a peaceful solution.
• U.S. support for the Chun Doo-Hwan regime, including an invitation for Chun to be the first head of state to visit Pres. Reagan in 1981, despite Kwangju.
In each of these historical instances, among others that could be cited, the U.S. took actions in its own perceived self-interest, ignoring or suppressing the interests of the Korean people. These, in turn, serve as a backdrop to more recent instances in which U.S. administrations have considered serious actions in Korea without engaging the Government in Seoul. Notably, these include how close the U.S. came to unilateral military action against the DPRK in 1994 and, most recently, the manner in which rhetoric – and war-planning – escalated in 2017. The potential was very real, of hostilities over which the Government of President Moon Jae-In would have no say or veto power, had the U.S. determined that unilateral action against the DPRK was warranted.
I have chosen the term “Hubris” to describe these actions, as they represent an attitude that U.S. interests supersede the wishes of the Korean people – even those expressed by the democratically-elected Government of the U.S.’s ally, the ROK. We must be vigilant in weeks, months, and years ahead, as this arrogance of power is still evident even as the two states on the Korean Peninsula seek dialogue and steps toward reconciliation.
On the one hand, President Moon has been praised as a “Go-between in negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK”. On the other hand, however, the U.S. (and Japan, to which I will turn in a moment), have proclaimed a continuation of “Maximum Pressure” on the DPRK, even as President Moon has signaled, in his three Summit Meetings with Chairman Kim, a path towards reconciliation that offers economic assistance and other measures that implicitly require – on the road to a negotiated solution to pressing issues – a reduction of pressure.
With its own history of colonial domination and cultural warfare against Korea, the Government of Japan, too, might consider how the term “Hubris” applies. Issues of importance to the Korean people – including an honest confession of Japan’s official utilization of so-called “Comfort Women” during the Pacific War, rather than an effort at obfuscation and denial of official responsibility – would be a start. Japan’s own concerns over the unresolved Abductee issue are naturally of significance to Japan, but it is the height of hubris for that issue to obstruct progress towards a peaceful settlement and reconciliation that would avoid the outbreak of war on the Peninsula.
The contrast to “Hubris” is “Humility”. The former – Hubris – is ingrained in international relations as powerful nations seek to assert their interests as paramount;; the latter – Humility – is less evident, as it implies a soulful recognition that actions taken by governments may have been misguided and need to be reassessed and rectified. Rather than being perceived as a weakness, such humility should be praised as a sign of the strength of a nation’s character. Similarly, hubris should be recognized as an empty sign of arrogance. Will our efforts to “speak truth to power” succeed in these times of fragile opportunity, asserting the interests of the Korean people to envision and build their own more peaceful future?
Steps toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula – Clarifying historical context & a realistic path forward
As we seek peaceful reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula in the spirit of the 2018 Panmunjom and P’yongyang Declarations, the broader issues of the Korean War’s end – and steps in that direction – revolve around a solution to the nuclear weapons’ issue.
The world has watched with apprehension and hope that tensions surrounding the acquisition of a nuclear weapons’ capability by the DPRK – and the miniaturization and delivery capability of those weapons – might be solved peacefully. I share in those hopes, and just as I have tried to do in shedding light on historical contexts of war and the Korean people’s decision-rights for their own national future, it is my hope to share a few contextual thoughts on the pressing nuclear issue as well.
I’d like to start with a simplified set of questions and circumstances, as I believe they hold the key to our collective steps forward.
First, why do nations seek to develop and acquire a nuclear weapons’ capability?
Second, what was the context that led the Republic of Korea to embark on a nuclear weapons’ capability of its own in the mid-1970s? What led the ROK to abandon that program mid-stream?
Third, does that attempt by the ROK to “go nuclear” help us understand the rationale for the DPRK’s nuclear-weapons’ program in the early 1990s?
Fourth, is the DPRK entirely to blame for the breakdown of the Agreed Framework and related efforts to avoid the full-scale development of a nuclear-weapons’ capability? How accurate are media accounts of that process and its breakdown, highlighting only DPRK actions rather than fairly portraying policy shifts and back- tracking on both sides?
Fifth, international sanctions imposed by the UN have sought to pressure the DPRK into a unilateral denuclearization process, and various nations have asserted that the sanctions are what has led the DPRK to a stated stance pledging denuclearization. Is that an accurate assertion, or was there a recognition by the younger, newer leadership in P’yongyang that Korea is genuinely at an historic moment of opportunity? Furthermore, will continued, “Maximum Pressure” tactics really have their desired effect?
Sixth, if we have sought to understand the reasons the DPRK sought and succeeded in acquiring a nuclear weapons’ capability, and its more recently stated intent to implement a thorough denuclearization, have we understood the basic conditions under which that denuclearization is likely to be possible and succeed?
Seventh, what guarantees for the security and safety of the DPRK would be sufficient for the DPRK to unilaterally denuclearize, in the face of the continued deployment of the world’s most advanced nuclear capability – by the United States – in a threatening, offensive force posture – a posture maintained by a nation that has refused to issue a “No First Strike” policy declaration? Is there reciprocity in steps toward – and an insistence on – denuclearization? Is the U.S. prepared to reduce or eliminate its nuclear weapons or threat of their use? If not, why not?
Eighth, as I write, there is a stand-off between those who have called for a loosening of the UN-imposed sanctions, on the one hand, urging a graduated process by which the DPRK should be credited with its progress shown to date, and encouraged to take further steps on promises of further good-faith steps towards denuclearization. On the other hand, there are those who insist on “Maximum Pressure” until full and verifiable, irreversible denuclearization by the DPRK has been confirmed. Which of these reflects the stated intent and good-faith efforts shown thus far by the DPRK? If the Republic of Korea has urged a relaxation of pressure implicit in its pledge for economic assistance and cooperation with the DPRK, should others persist and insist otherwise?
We will likely not have time to explore each question in detail, but in our collective search for a lasting solution to the militarized tensions on the Korean Peninsula – notably intensified by the nuclear program successfully accomplished by the DPRK – these are crucial questions.
First, nations have, in the majority of cases, developed and strengthened their nuclear weapons’ capabilities as a potent deterrent to threats of attack by others.
Second, the ROK sought a nuclear capability when it lost faith in the “nuclear umbrella” and security provided by its key ally, the U.S., as the U.S. moved closer to defeat in the Vietnam War, eventually “losing” anti-communist South Vietnam to its communist counterpart in the North. The ROK was dissuaded at that time by the U.S. from pursuing its nuclear weapons’ program by a reiteration of the security guarantee maintained by the U.S. This “security guarantee” is worth remembering.
Third, the crucial steps towards the DPRK nuclear weapons’ program began in earnest with the collapse of its Soviet ally, the USSR, in late 1989 to 1991. Losing its “nuclear umbrella”, the DPRK felt compelled to secure a deterrent capability against an offensive nuclear capability possessed and deployed by the U.S.
It is worth recalling, at this juncture, the real and existential threat of nuclear attack faced by the DPRK since early in its existence, beginning in October 1950 during the Korean War. A brief listing of that perceived threat includes the following points:
• In “Operation Hudson Harbor”, the U.S. flew sole B-29 Bombers high above the DPRK capital, P’yongyang, dropping large “dummy bombs” in a calculated effort to intimidate the DPRK, just 5 years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, several months into the Korean War.
• The U.S. developed plans for the use of atomic weapons against the DPRK – and against neighboring PRC/China and the Soviet Far East – during the Korean War, transporting atomic weapons from mainland U.S. facilities to Guam and Okinawa;; Gen. MacArthur was dismissed by President Truman in large part over the General’s stated preference and intent to utilize atomic weapons against the DPRK and its communist neighbors.
• A frequently-stated suspicion and concern in the U.S. defense establishment is that the DPRK has located thousands of its key governmental and security facilities deeply underground;; it is rarely acknowledged that this may have been in direct response to the threat of atomic/nuclear attack from the U.S.
• From approximately 1957 through 1993, the only atomic/nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean Peninsula were U.S. weapons, targeting the DPRK.
• These U.S. weapons ranged in yield and delivery mechanisms from land, sea, and air-based missiles, to “portable”, 2-3-person battlefield weapons such as the “Davy Crocket”, with a low explosive yield, but with a high likelihood of being used in any conflict, as field officers were likely under orders to “use rather than lose” those atomic weapons to “enemy forces” should conflict break out. The threshold of battlefield atomic warfare had fallen quite low.
• The creator of the “Neutron Bomb” is on record as having done so in response to the terrain he witnessed in Korea;; this weapon would reportedly destroy life without destroying the infrastructure against which it would be used, and could potentially have been used against the DPRK’s underground facilities.
• As witnessed from U.S. governmental and military pronouncements in 2017, U.S. strategic forces are deployed on an around-the-clock basis within close flying time to targets in the DPRK, “locked and ready” in the words of the U.S. Commander in Chief, to inflict unacceptable damage to the DPRK as a whole.
My remarks in reminding us of the existential threat of atomic/nuclear attack faced by the DPRK through much of its existence, Is in no way a “justification” of the DPRK nuclear-weapons’ program. Rather, it is an impartial effort to explain why a small and impoverished nation felt compelled to develop a deterrent lest it be unilaterally attacked – whether in “surgical strikes” or in an all-out effort to destroy North Korean society and bring about “regime change” at the hands of the United States’ military.
That nation has now declared, in multiple forums and directly to the Presidents of the ROK and the U.S., its intent to denuclearize, on the sole condition that it receive a guarantee of its security. To date, no credible assurances of its security – whether in advance or after it dismantles its deterrent nuclear capability – appear to have been offered in return.
Steps forward in “securing the peace” – Denuclearization in a context of a verifiable Rapprochement and Peace-building Paradigm
We have pointed to an existing paradigm in which the Korean Peninsula is perceived and analyzed by major powers – principally the U.S. and Japan – from a “Strategic Security-first” perspective that maintains “peace” on a constant war-footing. The paradigm is based on key assumptions that, as with any dominant paradigm, are not easily called into question. These include:
• An “enemy image” of extreme distrust of the DPRK, doubting any non- belligerent intent;;
• A portrayal of the DPRK as “unpredictable” and as a “rogue state”;;
• A sense that “preservation of the regime” is paramount and pathological in the case of the DPRK, ignoring the reality that any regime – including for the governments of the U.S., Japan, or elsewhere – view regime preservation as a natural and unequivocal political right and national priority;;
• A readiness to engage in warfare, including the likely use of nuclear weapons deployed in the U.S. arsenal adjacent to Korea pre-targeted on the DPRK;;
• An instinctive suspicion of diplomatic initiatives and dialogue as signs of “appeasement” and weakness in the face of “enemy deceit”;;
• A non-negotiable posture of sanctions and “Maximum Pressure” to force unilateral denuclearization by the DPRK, with no reciprocal offer of a security guarantee for the DPRK or denuclearization steps by the U.S.;; and
• An hegemonic belief that the U.S. (and Japan) are justified in their views and decision-rights in influencing or determining the future of Korea, irrespective of the perspectives or policy preferences of the people or governments of Korea.
In this context, with “Clausewitz on his head” and a "war-fighting mentality” dominant in U.S. policy circles for decades, developments surrounding the Korean Peninsula in 2018 have caused consternation and have created the real possibility of backlash. Those wed to the existing paradigm will feel threatened, and the intensity with which they perceive the “enemy” – the DPRK – as deceitful, single-minded of purpose to destabilize and overthrow the ROK, and never to be trusted, will lead to predictable efforts to undermine the trajectory and promises of success of meaningful dialogue.
For those of us who see this paradigm as inherently unstable, destructive of lasting peace, prone to escalation and the potential renewal of hostilities, and as a profound disrespect for the decision-making rights of the Korean people to determine their nation’s future, we offer a counter-balanced paradigm.
If reconciliation and a verifiable reduction of tensions – including denuclearization – are the desired “end-game”, then the paradigm needs to instill a proactive search for the mechanisms that will build trust, instill confidence, promote mutual understanding and dialogue, emphasize non-military solutions, and enable the free flow of ideas towards a shared Korean vision of unity and – when agreed upon – reunification.
That paradigm calls for a series of practical steps that reflect a peace-building intent, beginning with the following:
1. Full, reciprocal diplomatic recognition among the DPRK, U.S., and Japan;;
2. Timely and systematic steps towards a Peace Treaty to replace the Armistice;;
3. Confidence-building measures in military, cultural, social, and political fields;;
4. The timely lifting of economic sanctions, combined with the promotion of a rebuilding of the economic infrastructure of the DPRK through concerted ROK and 3rd-party (ADB, IBRD) investment, to alleviate poverty and build the foundations for an eventual integration of the ROK and DPRK economies;;
5. A reciprocal reduction in DPRK & ROK offensive military capabilities, combined with a verifiable denuclearization of the DPRK and a verifiable “No First-Use” pledge by the U.S., key to a security guarantee for the DPRK;; and
6. The building of jointly-administered institutions to foster long-term cooperation and, when the Korean people are at liberty to decide their future, a peaceful reunification of the Korean nation and Peninsula.
Concluding Remarks
We are aware that a Paradigm Shift of this nature is difficult to bring about. I have faith, however, in the Korean people’s ability to bring about lasting, profound change – and I base my faith on 45 years of an intense and personal encounter with Korea.
I was privileged and honored to have worked side-by-side in quiet support of remarkable individuals in the long struggle for democratization and respect for human rights. They risked their lives and livelihoods, paying a heavy price for their conviction that civil and human rights, representative institutions and the rule of law, and the dignity of the Korean people to stand proud on the global stage, would be achieved. They, and the Korean people, persevered, overcame enormous hardships, and have succeeded in building a representative, democratic society.
Just as I feel honored to be with you today, I feel humbled as well. I am honored to be a citizen of the U.S., feeling a deep resonance with that nation’s deeply-held principles and values, yet I am humbled to have witnessed the arrogance of U.S. power in the pursuit of its own interests in Korea, often with painful results for the people of Korea who firmly believed in truth and justice, in peace and reconciliation.
To have known and walked with principled leaders has been an honor – with Teacher Hahm Sok-Hon, with Presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun (being reunited with them in the Blue House), with Rev. Kim Kwan-Suk, Revs. Moon Ik- Hwan and Moon Dong-Hwan, Prof Ahn Byung-Moo, with (Korea’s first woman attorney) Lee Tae-Young, with Presidents Yun Bo-Sun and Kim Young-Sam, with staunch women fighters for democracy including First Lady Lee Hee-Ho and First Lady Kwon Dok-Hui, with Prof Chi Myon-Kwan, dear friend Oh Jae-Shik, and with dear friends and colleagues in this room, including Ahn Jae-Woong. I am privileged and honored to have known and worked with these and other amazing individuals. It was also an honor to attend the funeral of respected intellectual Chang Chun-Ha at Myongdong Cathedral in the summer of 1975;; to sit in the courtroom in 1976 for the trials of the 18 defendants in the March 1st “Myongdong” Declaration for Democratic Salvation case;; to attend the four Christian Ministers in their own 1976 March 1st Declaration trial in Kwangju;; to witness – sitting next to Teacher Hahm Sok-Hon – the impassioned Last Statement in Court of poet Kim Chi-Ha, also in 1976, when his sentence to death was upheld even as he called for a democratic “Seoul Spring”;; and to sing Christmas Carols from the bitterly cold hill overlooking Suhdaemun Prison on Christmas Eve, 1976, hearing the 18 defendants in the Myongdong case sing back with calls for democracy. Each of these is firmly embedded in my memory as an honor, never to be forgotten.
It was the work and spirit of these individuals, combined with the efforts of thousands of others – including many in this room today – that enabled the vision of a democratic Korea to become reality. Knowing – witnessing – their strength, courage, and dedication to that vision is why I am also confident that the vision we now share so fervently – for a peaceful reconciliation and future on the Korean Peninsula – will also succeed. Thank you for your patience.
Thank you for the opportunity to share this crucial moment in Korea’s history with you.
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